The Problem with Dispositionalism about Meaning
Dispositionalism about meaning is a perennial temptation, and many philosophers have thought that most, if not all, attempts to naturalize semantics boil down to versions of dispositionalism, so it is worthwhile to try and articulate a basic (perhaps the basic) problem with it.
To begin with, it is worth noting that philosophers have meant two very different things by “dispositionalism about meaning”. On the one hand, they have used it to refer to hermeneutical theories that aim to capture most, if not all, of the aspects of meaning that we ordinarily recognize (e.g., the distinction between using a term correctly and using it incorrectly). On the other hand, they have also used it to refer to radically revisionary theories which are happy to abandon whichever aspects of meaning that they cannot explain.
The basic problem with the first sort of dispositional theory is that it cannot account for the difference between correct and incorrect uses of a term. Think about the meaning of a referring term such as “cow”, for example. On the simplest possible formulation of the first sort of dispositional theory, “cow” means whatever we are disposed to use it to refer to. (For the sake of argument, please disregard the obvious problem that this dispositional theory is circular in that it uses reference to explain meaning. This is a real problem for dispositional theories, but not the one I’m going to discuss here. Please note, however, that replacing “to refer to” with “in the presence of” avoids the problem of circularity only by creating an entirely new problem of radical indeterminacy and an inability to refer to anything not present.) The basic problem with this simple theory is that it implies that if we make a mistake, and use “cow” to refer to something other than a cow, “cow” thereby comes to mean whatever we mistakenly use it to refer to. (Or, more subtly, it comes to mean cow-or-whatever-we-mistakenly-use-it-to-refer-to.)
The obvious move for a dispositionalist to make at this point is to start constraining the conditions in which our dispositions determine the meaning of our terms. Dispositionalists cannot, however, simply constrain these conditions by saying that “cow” means whatever we are disposed to use it to refer to, when we use it correctly. So there is a real explanatory burden that their theory must confront. Of course, many philosophers have tried to confront this burden. But no matter what conditions they specify, it seems intuitively obvious that these conditions can be met and we can still make a mistake and use a term incorrectly. (Perhaps there is a real conflict of basic intuitions at this point, in which those disposed toward dispositionalism are disposed to think that there could be conditions under which it would be impossible for anyone to make a mistake, and those disposed against dispositionalism are disposed to think that human fallibility precludes the possibility of such conditions; I think this is an interesting question worth pursuing, but I am not going to pursue it here.) It is not essential that one find this intuitively obvioius. Since the burden of proof is on the dispositionalist to show that dispositionalist can explain meaning, all that is needed for the anti-dispositionalist's criticism to succeed is to show that it is possibile to make a mistake within the conditions specified by whatever substantive dispostionalist theories have actually been proposed.
At this point, a tempting move for a dispositionalist to make is to deny that our ordinary sense of the distinction between using a term correctly and using a term incorrectly is essential. Perhaps all that “using a term correctly” means is using a term in the way we are disposed to in the conditions specified by his or her preferred dispositionalist theory. As tempting as this move is, it must be noted that at this point the defender of dispositionalism has abandoned the first sort of hermeneutical theory in favor of the radically revisionary second sort. But I think this shift calls for some honest self-reflection on the part of the dipositionalist. Why, for instance, doesn’t the abandonment of the first sort of theory constitute an acknowledgement that meaning cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms? Why, in other words, doesn’t the recognition that the distinction between using a term correctly and using a term incorrectly (a distinction that we ordinarily take to be an essential aspect of meaning) cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms show that meaning cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms? Why continue to be committed to defending dispositionalism, when it disregards precisely what we originally set out to understand? Before these questions are answered, I cannot see why dispositionalism should merit any more attention.
To begin with, it is worth noting that philosophers have meant two very different things by “dispositionalism about meaning”. On the one hand, they have used it to refer to hermeneutical theories that aim to capture most, if not all, of the aspects of meaning that we ordinarily recognize (e.g., the distinction between using a term correctly and using it incorrectly). On the other hand, they have also used it to refer to radically revisionary theories which are happy to abandon whichever aspects of meaning that they cannot explain.
The basic problem with the first sort of dispositional theory is that it cannot account for the difference between correct and incorrect uses of a term. Think about the meaning of a referring term such as “cow”, for example. On the simplest possible formulation of the first sort of dispositional theory, “cow” means whatever we are disposed to use it to refer to. (For the sake of argument, please disregard the obvious problem that this dispositional theory is circular in that it uses reference to explain meaning. This is a real problem for dispositional theories, but not the one I’m going to discuss here. Please note, however, that replacing “to refer to” with “in the presence of” avoids the problem of circularity only by creating an entirely new problem of radical indeterminacy and an inability to refer to anything not present.) The basic problem with this simple theory is that it implies that if we make a mistake, and use “cow” to refer to something other than a cow, “cow” thereby comes to mean whatever we mistakenly use it to refer to. (Or, more subtly, it comes to mean cow-or-whatever-we-mistakenly-use-it-to-refer-to.)
The obvious move for a dispositionalist to make at this point is to start constraining the conditions in which our dispositions determine the meaning of our terms. Dispositionalists cannot, however, simply constrain these conditions by saying that “cow” means whatever we are disposed to use it to refer to, when we use it correctly. So there is a real explanatory burden that their theory must confront. Of course, many philosophers have tried to confront this burden. But no matter what conditions they specify, it seems intuitively obvious that these conditions can be met and we can still make a mistake and use a term incorrectly. (Perhaps there is a real conflict of basic intuitions at this point, in which those disposed toward dispositionalism are disposed to think that there could be conditions under which it would be impossible for anyone to make a mistake, and those disposed against dispositionalism are disposed to think that human fallibility precludes the possibility of such conditions; I think this is an interesting question worth pursuing, but I am not going to pursue it here.) It is not essential that one find this intuitively obvioius. Since the burden of proof is on the dispositionalist to show that dispositionalist can explain meaning, all that is needed for the anti-dispositionalist's criticism to succeed is to show that it is possibile to make a mistake within the conditions specified by whatever substantive dispostionalist theories have actually been proposed.
At this point, a tempting move for a dispositionalist to make is to deny that our ordinary sense of the distinction between using a term correctly and using a term incorrectly is essential. Perhaps all that “using a term correctly” means is using a term in the way we are disposed to in the conditions specified by his or her preferred dispositionalist theory. As tempting as this move is, it must be noted that at this point the defender of dispositionalism has abandoned the first sort of hermeneutical theory in favor of the radically revisionary second sort. But I think this shift calls for some honest self-reflection on the part of the dipositionalist. Why, for instance, doesn’t the abandonment of the first sort of theory constitute an acknowledgement that meaning cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms? Why, in other words, doesn’t the recognition that the distinction between using a term correctly and using a term incorrectly (a distinction that we ordinarily take to be an essential aspect of meaning) cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms show that meaning cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms? Why continue to be committed to defending dispositionalism, when it disregards precisely what we originally set out to understand? Before these questions are answered, I cannot see why dispositionalism should merit any more attention.
posted by Charles P. Everitt at 1:09 PM
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